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ABSTRACT  
Solar storms are a phenomenon that has a wide array of adverse consequences on technological systems, 
power systems in particular. During severe solar storms a geomagnetically induced current (GIC) starts to flow 
through long conducting structures, such as power lines and pipelines. The probability of solar storms has a 
roughly linear relation with the sunspot activity level which varies in 11 years cycles and at the moment of 
writing this thesis we are approaching the maxima of solar cycle 24. This thesis is a risk analysis of GIC in power 
systems and describes the causes and sources of GIC, the consequences, both on component level and on 
system level, and the likelihood of occurrence. 
When GIC flows through a transformer it causes the core to saturate, which leads to (a) increased reactive 
power consumption, (b) high levels of harmonics in the power system and (c) localized heating of the 
transformer. Point a and b are confirmed through simulations. High harmonics levels can cause protective 
relays to sense false fault conditions and trip. On a system level this can lead to (a) loss of production (b) local 
blackouts or (c) widespread blackouts. Localized heating of transformers can lead to permanent damage and 
spare parts and replacement units are associated with having long lead times. Communication and control 
systems are also subject to GIC and other solar storm related interferences. The thesis also contains a 
discussion about GIC risk associated to gas pipelines. 
The likelihood of solar storms is discussed and a method for determining the exceedance probability of 
extreme values for solar storms such as a 100-year storm is presented. The exceedance probability of a 100-
year storm during 2012-2014 is estimated to 4.7%. 
Possible risk treatment strategies and forecasting capabilities are also briefly discussed, in order to briefly 
illustrate possible risk management schemes. 
This report should facilitate risk evaluation and provide the information needed to calculate quantitative risk 
values with respect to solar storms and power systems. 
In order to fully understand the extent of the consequences of a 100-year storm further studies are needed in 
order to take the complexities of covariance and the interconnectedness of different components and systems 
into account. 
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ACRONYMS AND NOTATIONS 
ACRONYMS 
AC/DC Alternating Current/ Direct Current 
ACE Advanced Composition Explorer, a NASA space craft launched on August 25, 1997 
CME Coronal Mass Ejection 
CP Cathodic Protection 
emf ElectroMotive Force 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency  
GIC  Geomagnetically Induced Current 
GPS Global Positioning System, a satellite based navigation and timing system  
HF High Frequency 
ISES International Space Environmental Service 
MSB Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration, agency of the United States government 
responsible for aviation and spaceflight 
SDO The Solar Dynamics Observatory, is the first mission to be launched for NASA's Living With a 
Star (LWS) Program. The mission was launched on February 11, 2010. 
SIDC Solar Influences Data Analysis Center 
SOHO Solar & Heliospheric Observatory, a spacecraft built in collaboration between ESA and NASA to 
study the sun. The mission was launched on December 2, 1995. 
SPE Solar Proton Event 
STEREO STEREO (Solar TErrestrial RElations Observatory) is the third mission in NASA's Solar Terrestrial 
Probes program (STP). The mission was launched in October 2006. 
THD Total Harmonic Distortion, a measurement of the harmonic distortion. Defined as the ratio of 
the sum of the powers of all harmonic components to the power of the fundamental 
frequency. 
 
NOTATIONS 
        Magnetic field 
        Electric field 
  Permeability  
   Permeability in vacuum 
 ,  ( )  ( ) Impedance 
  Angular frequency 
a, b System specific GIC parameters 
      Voltage, emf 
  Number (integer) 
  Magnetic flux 
  
  
 Change in magnetic flux, time derivative 
  Resistance 
  Magnetic reluctance 
  Conductivity 
  Current 
P Effect (heat) 
  Length (of pipe) 
 ( ) Ground conductivity factor 
 ( ) Geomagnetic latitude factor 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Solar activity and the likelihood of solar storms vary in 11-year cycles. We are now again approaching a solar 
maximum and it is therefore of interest to investigate solar storm related risks for power systems. This thesis 
aims to provide an overview of solar storm related risks, especially risks relating to geomagnetic induced 
currents (GIC) in transformers. The goal is, with the aid of risk methodology, to investigate and describe the 
entire chain of events that constitutes a solar storm, its possible consequences and potential risk mitigation 
activities.courtesy  
The thesis is carried out in collaboration with E.ON Sverige AB, who has courteously contributed with 
workspace, discussions, interviews and data from historical events. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of a solar storm. A coronal mass ejection is ejected from the sun, travels through space and collides with Earth’s 
magnetic field (courtesy  of NASA). 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Geomagnetically induced current (GIC) is a phenomenon caused by the interaction between space weather and 
the Earth’s magnetic field (see Figure 1). As violent space weather penetrates the Earth’s magnetosphere 
(often referred to as a geomagnetic storm) it can result in a high current electrojet in the ionosphere. This 
electrojet can reach several million amperes during geomagnetic storms. As this current varies with time it 
induces an electric field at the ground level, called a geoelectric field. The geoelectric field will in turn cause a 
current to flow in the geoelectric field’s direction, a geomagnetically induced current (GIC) (Wik, 2008). This 
current will take the path of least resistance. In areas of high ground resistivity the current will flow through 
power lines, gas pipelines or other available conductive media such as railway (see Figure 2). GIC flowing 
through such man-made structures have the potential to cause great harm to it. In general GIC is more likely to 
be a problem in areas at higher latitudes and with high ground resistivity. For power systems in particular, 
geometrical and structural setup also have significant influence, transformers located in corners of the power 
grid and at the end of long power-lines are more GIC susceptible. GIC and geomagnetic storms are not only a 
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problem for power systems; it can also directly influence technical systems such as, HF-radio, GPS, railway, 
communication systems (both wired and wireless), pipelines and geological surveys (Koskinen et al., 2001). For 
gas pipelines, GIC can cause a variation in the pipe to soil voltage which can disturb the cathodic protection 
system (Pirjola, 1999). 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of GIC generation (courtesy  of Antti Pulkkinen). 
Even though GIC as a phenomenon was first observed in the telegraph system, as early as 1848 (Barlow, 1849) 
there have been relatively few studies of the socioeconomic impact of space weather. It was not until the 
blackout of Hydro-Québec's power grid during the geomagnetic storm of March 1989, which left millions of 
people without power for up to nine hours, that solar storms widely came to be treated as a risk to society and 
its critical infrastructure (Baker et al., 2008). E.ON Sverige AB (formerly Sydkraft) has also experienced several 
GIC related incidents, not least during the, popularly named, Halloween storm of 2003 in which parts of Malmö 
were left without power for 20-50 minutes. The largest GIC-current ever measured in the world was almost 300 
A and was detected in Sweden 2004 (Wik, 2008). While GIC and geoelectric field strengths are orders of 
magnitude higher at higher latitudes, a covariance between GIC in gas pipelines in Sweden and in Greece has 
been found – clearly illustrating that this is not a local phenomenon (H-E Edwall, personal communication, June  
22, 2011). 
As the modern technological society grows more complex and interdependent, governments have become 
increasingly concerned about threats against critical infrastructures (MSB, 2009). 
 In February 2010 a European and North American summit was held with the purpose of discussing 
international cooperation in the event of a crisis caused by a severe geomagnetic storm. The summit 
was hosted by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and its US counterpart the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (MSB, 2010).  
 On March 1 2011 an EU-project, European Risk from Geomagnetically Induced Currents (EURISGIC) 
started with the goal of producing the first European-wide real-time prototype forecast service of GIC 
in power systems.  
 On December 2 2011 MSB hosted a seminar on solar storms and electromagnetic interference (MSB, 
2011a). 
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 In a recently published report on national risk assessment, MSB names solar storms as a national risk 
for Sweden. The report is part of MSB strategy for protection of critical infrastructure which in its turn 
is a part of the European program for critical infrastructure protection (MSB, 2011b). 
Today, twenty-two years after the Hydro-Québec blackout, we are approaching a new maximum in solar 
activity and it is of increasing interest to review how well we are equipped to handle the effects of severe space 
weather. 
1.2 GOAL AND SCOPE 
The goal of this report is to provide a comprehensive analysis of risks relating to solar storms and power supply, 
especially risk relating to geomagnetic induced currents. This will be achieved with the aid of risk methodology, 
by investigating and describing, the entire chain of events that constitutes a solar storm, its possible 
consequences, and potential risk mitigation activities. 
It will not be practical to provide quantitative risk values for the identified risks on the general level of this 
report, since the risk values will vary from component to component and likewise on a system level. The report 
will instead aim to provide general qualitative information needed to calculate these quantitative risk values. 
The report could also be an aid during risk management for any risk relating to highly disturbed space weather. 
For these reasons the structure of the report is planned to guide the reader through the different risk elements 
which will be described in the following chapter. 
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2 RISK ANALYSIS OF SOLAR STORMS 
Risk is a central concept in this report and a short introduction to the subject of risk and risk management 
should be helpful both in understanding the method and as a reason behind the layout of this report. 
For reasons of simplicity and generality definitions and methods relating to risk and risk management are taken 
from ISO 3100:2009; Risk management – Principles and guidelines (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2009). 
Risk is here defined as: “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (International Organization for Standardization, 
2009, p. 1). This definition can seem a bit vague, but in the context of this report the implications are quite 
concrete. Here a risk is the likelihood of and the adverse effects that highly disturbed space weather have on 
power systems. The objective is hence the uninterrupted production, transmission and delivery of power and 
the uncertainty relates to occurrence of highly disturbed space weather. This definition is quite unproblematic 
since there are very few upsides from solar storms. 
In order for an organization to handle risk rationally and effectively, it is important to understand the risk 
source and its consequences correctly. This can be achieved by using a systematic and structured risk 
management method, see Figure 3. Each of these process steps will in their turn contain several sub processes, 
not described in any detail here (for detailed descriptions please refer to (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2009, p. 13-21)).  
 
Figure 3: Overview of ISO 31000 risk management process (courtesy  of Nils Rosengren). 
 The goal of risk identification is to generate a comprehensive list of risks based on those events that 
might create, enhance, prevent, degrade, accelerate or delay achievement of objectives. 
 Risk analysis involves considering the causes and sources of risk, their consequences and the likelihood 
of occurrence. It is also important to consider the interdependence of different risks and their sources. 
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 The purpose of risk evaluation is to assist in making decisions about the need and priority of risk 
treatment. This involves comparing the risk level found during analysis with the risk tolerance of the 
stakeholders and other requirements. 
 Risk treatment is the step of selecting and implementing options for modifying the risk. 
A conventional way of describing risk is by first describing the source of the risk, followed by the likelihood of 
occurrence, ending with a description of the consequences. This formula effectively communicates the three 
elements, root cause, likelihood, and consequence and promotes a consensus in understanding of the risk and 
how to evaluate it. By then analyzing the likelihood of occurrence and the impact on objectives, the risk can 
then be evaluated either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
The chapter that follows is a short review of three noteworthy historical events and their consequences that 
will give a background to the phenomena and illustrate the risk. Then follows a general review of the risk 
source with solar storms, the chain of events that starts in the interior of the Sun and ends as a geomagnetic 
storm on Earth and a discussion about the probability of solar storms. The third part of the report examines the 
component level consequences, i.e. how the power system components are affected. The fourth part continues 
the analysis by discussing the system level consequences and system interdependencies. This is then followed 
by a discussion about likelihood of solar storms. The risk analysis is finally concluded by a short review of 
possible risk treatment alternatives, a short summary and conclusions. 
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3 REVIEW OF HISTORICAL SOLAR STORM EVENTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST 
While solar storms as a phenomenon have only been known for about a century and a half, there have 
occurred several storms in this period that have had adverse effect on human technological systems. In the 
following chapter three of these events will be discussed since they are of particular interest in the context of 
this report. The first event is both the earliest and strongest storm on record. The second event is the storm 
that has had the largest consequences for power systems and arguably the first time GIC was put on the 
agenda as a high risk for power systems. The third and last event in this chapter is one of the most recent 
storms and one that has had the largest consequences for power systems in the southern part of Sweden. 
3.1 THE CARRINGTON EVENT, SEPTEMBER 1, 1859 
The Carrington event, named after British astronomer Richard Carrington, is both the strongest and one of the 
earliest ever recorded geomagnetic storms.  
3.1.1 CONSEQUENCES 
On the morning of September 1
st
 1859 Richard Carrington observed a previously unknown phenomenon, an 
extremely intense solar flare. The geomagnetic storm struck 17 hours later and it lasted for days. Reports of the 
storm came from all over the world. Auroras where observed as close to the equator as the Caribbean. By 
some reports it was bright enough to read newspapers by the light of the aurora alone (Phillips, 2009). 
Telegraph systems went down all over Europe and North America, in some cases even giving electrical shocks 
to operators and causing fires (Baker et al., 2008). 
3.1.2 WORST CASE SCENARIO 
There have been later storms of similar magnitude with respect to some parameters, but all in all the 
Carrington event is thought to be the strongest storm in the last 500 years (McCracken et al., 2001; Townsend 
et al., 2003). Thus the Carrington event has often been used as a basis for worst case scenarios involving severe 
space weather. This does of course not preclude that a bigger storm may occur at any time and thus it is not 
reasonable to use this event as a basis for a worst case scenario without any further statistical analysis 
(Pulkkinen et al., 2012). 
CONSEQUENCES OF A SIMILAR STORM TODAY 
While the probability of a storm of the same magnitude is very low the consequences to society could be 
daunting. In 1859 the use of electricity based technology was in its infancy and the consequences of the 
Carrington event were very limited. If such an event where to happen today it is very hard to assess the 
damage to society due to the increasingly complex interdependency of society’s critical infrastructure. A recent 
study by the US National Academy of Sciences estimated the cost to society in the range of US$1 trillion to 
US$2 trillion during the first year alone with recovery times of 4 to 10 years (Baker et al., 2008). 
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3.2 THE HYDRO-QUÉBEC EVENT, MARCH 13, 1989 
At 2:44 a.m. on March 13
th
 1989 a 100 ton static VAR capacitor at Chibougamau sub-station, Québec, Canada, 
tripped and went offline due to GIC causing a protective relay to sense overload conditions. 
3.2.1 CONSEQUENCES 
The tripped VAR capacitor caused a cascade of failures throughout the Québec power grid; most notably five 
transmission lines from James Bay were tripped causing a loss of 9,450 MW. The total load in the grid at the 
time was about 21,350 MW. A mere 75 seconds after the first capacitor went down most of the province was 
left without power. Automatic load reduction systems tried to restore balance in the power system by 
disconnecting towns and regions but failed. This cascade of spreading failures was much too fast for any 
meaningful form of manual intervention by operators to take place. 6 million of Hydro-Québecs customers 
were left without power for up to 9 hours. 
About 200 other separate events due to the storm were also reported from North America (see Figure 4), of 
which the catastrophic failure
1
 of a step-up transformer at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey was 
probably the most serious one (see Figure 5) (Baker et al., 2008).
 
Figure 4: Illustration of GIC related failures from the storm March 13 1989 (Electric Power Research Institute). 
                                                                
1
 “A catastrophic failure is a sudden and total failure of some system from which recovery is impossible. Catastrophic 
failures often lead to cascading systems failure.” (Wikipedia, 2012) 
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Figure 5: Close-up view of a part of the transformer that was damaged at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant (courtesy  of Peter Balma). 
RISK TREATMENT IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE EVENT 
Shortly after the blackout Hydro-Québec organized a task force to analyze the events and propose corrective 
measures. According to (Hydro-Québec, n.d.) the following measures have since been applied: 
 Recalibration of protection systems and rising of the trip level. This tactic has proven effective, since 
there have been very intense magnetic storms since 1989 but they have not caused any problems. 
 Establishment of a real-time alert system that measures disturbances on the power grid during 
magnetic storms. 
 Modification of power system operating procedures. In the event of a disturbance, Hydro-Québec 
reduces power flow on lines and direct-current interconnections, and suspends all major switching 
operations. 
 Installation of series compensation on power lines to enhance grid stability. This measure has been 
very effective in mitigating the impact of magnetic storms. 
The damaged step-up transformer at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant had to be replaced. If existing spare parts 
could not have been found the lead time for production of replacement parts would have been close to 2 
years, even if the order where given top priority. The total cost for repairs and replacement electricity for the 
owner Public Service Electric and Gas was later estimated to be above US$ 20 million (Baker et al., 2008). 
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3.3 “THE HALLOWEEN STORM”, OCTOBER 30, 2003 
Two CMEs hit Earth close to each other in time. The first erupted from the Sun at 11:10 (UTC) on the 28
th
 of 
October 2003 and hit Earth about 19 hours later at roughly 06:10 (UTC). The second CME erupted at 20:49 
(UTC) and reached Earth at 16:20 (UTC). At 20:04 (UTC) the storm peaked and the geoelectric field reached 
values of 2 V/km in the Malmö region (Wik, 2008). 
3.3.1 CONSEQUENCES 
This storm had a wide array of consequences for different technological systems. The most interesting 
incidents in power systems are discussed here and a detailed list of GIC related incidents in the Swedish power 
system is given in the Appendix. Among other affected systems can be mentioned, the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS), a navigation system based on GPS, operated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, which was out of service for 30 hours and also the ADEOS-2 satellite that was severely 
damaged due to the storm (Baker et al., 2008). 
SWEDEN 
On October 30 21:07 (local time, UTC+1) 2003, a blackout
2
 occurred that lasted for 20-50 minutes and affected 
50 000 customers in Malmö and surrounding areas. The root cause was a relay in the 130 kV system. The relay 
was set too sensitive to the third harmonics (150 Hz) of the fundamental frequency (50 Hz) which was a result 
of transformer saturation due to GIC caused by geoelectric field values of 2 V/km (Malmgren, 2003; Wik, 2008). 
Also during the Halloween storm, a transformer at a Swedish nuclear power plant experienced a 13˚C increase 
in top oil temperature in a transformer containing 69 tons of oil before mitigating action were taken to allow 
the transformer to cool down (H. Swahn, personal communication, September 15, 2011). 
SOUTH AFRICA 
The same storm is reported to have caused significant transformer damage in South Africa. Over 15 
transformers in South Africa were damaged during this period, some beyond repair (Marusek, 2007; Gaunt & 
Coetzee, 2007). 
3.3.2 RISK TREATMENT IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE EVENT 
Two transformers have been replaced at the Swedish nuclear power plant. One of them has a new design 
aimed at making it more robust to GIC. The other one has had a resistor placed between the ground and the 
neutral, giving it a higher tolerance to GIC but possibly moving the problem elsewhere in the power system (H. 
Swahn, personal communication, September 15, 2011).  
                                                                
2
 Not to be mistaken for the voltage collapse the 23
rd
 of September 2003 that affected large areas of southern 
Sweden and Denmark. 
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4 SOLAR STORMS AND THREAT LEVEL 
In this chapter the source of solar storms will be reviewed: The chain of events that starts in the interior of the 
Sun and ends up as a current flowing through the power system.  
4.1 THE SUN 
The Sun is the source of most of the terrestrial space weather and, with the possible exception of a nova 
shockwave, it is the only natural source of GIC that we probably need to consider.  
The Sun is essentially a massive fusion reactor about 333 000 times the mass of Earth. Even though the Sun has 
been studied for millennia it is still an area of intense research and much remains to be understood.  
Some basic understanding of the sun, and its activity cycles (see Figure 6) and a general understanding of the 
source of space weather is important to have in order to understand the findings and reasoning throughout the 
report. 
 
Figure 6: The Sun at different stages in the solar cycle (see Figure 8 for solar cycle data) (courtesy , SOHO), starting with low activity in 
1997 and ending with high activity in 1999. 
4.1.1 A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLAR ACTIVITY 
The earliest evidence that the Sun is not static came from the observation of sunspots in the early 17
th
 century. 
Sunspots had been seen long before then, but it was not until the use of telescopes spread in Europe around 
1610 that sunspot studies began for real. Due to the scarcity of observations for a period, that has later come 
to be known as the Maunder minimum, we do not have reliable sunspot number data until 1749 (see Figure 7). 
It was first about 100 years later in 1843 that the German astronomer Samuel Heinrich Schwabe discovered a 
pattern in the variation in the number of sunspots. He had discovered the 11 year solar cycle, also known as a 
Schwabe cycle, after 19 years of intense studies of the sun
3
. Some 70 years later, George Ellery Hale 
                                                                
3
 Schwabe’s reason for studying the Sun every day for 19 years was to prove the existence of a hypnotized new 
planet inside the orbit of Mercury, which he had named Vulcan. 
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discovered
4
 the magnetic properties of sunspots. He found that the magnetic field in the sunspots area was 
1000 times greater than that of Earth. He also concluded that the solar cycle was actually roughly a 22-year 
long magnetic cycle containing two Schwabe cycles with opposed magnetic polarity, this 22-year cycle is today 
known as a Hale-cycle. “The 11-year solar cycle” is still the most widely used term since the magnetic polarity 
of the sunspots seldom has any impact. In this report any further reference to solar cycle refers to the 11-year 
Schwabe cycle. 
4.1.2 SUNSPOTS AND THE SOLAR CYCLE 
The number of sunspots still today remains a common way to measure solar activity and is by far our longest 
running data set for solar activity. In Figure 7 one can clearly see the periodicity of the solar cycle from the 
sunspot data. The cycles have been defined as beginning at the minimum point of the cycle with the 
occurrence of sunspots with changed magnetic polarity compared with the previous cycle. The current cycle, 
named “Solar Cycle 24”, was announced by NASA to have begun on January 4 2008 (Phillips, 2008). 
In January 2012 NASA predicted that solar cycle 24 will peak in February 2013 with a maximum of 96 sunspots 
(monthly average) (see Figure 8), estimated to be the smallest in over 80 years (Hathaway, 2012). 
Sunspots are the site of origin for most solar storms. They are perceived as dark areas on the surface of the Sun 
and they are in the same size range as Earth. The reason for their apparent darkness is that they have about 
2000K lover temperature compared to the surrounding area and thus they emit less light. The lower 
temperature is due to the strong magnetic fields that counteract the convection of hotter material moving 
towards the surface. As the magnetic activity of the Sun increases towards the solar maxima, more and more 
areas of intense buildup of magnetic energy are formed. This energy can then be released in complex ways that 
are not completely understood. There are several phenomena that seem to be connected to release of 
magnetic energy, solar flares and coronal mass ejection (CME) being the most interesting in the context of this 
report, since they are the phenomena that can cause GIC. 
Much of what’s going on inside the Sun and how it affects Earth is still unknown and this is an area of intense 
research. For example the NASA program Living With a Star (LWS) provides missions to improve our 
understanding of how and why the Sun varies, how the Earth and Solar System respond, and how the variability 
and response affects humanity in space and on Earth (NASA, 2011). 
There are many and more modern ways to measure the activity of the Sun than the counting of sunspots. But 
since sunspots are so closely related to the creation of coronal mass ejections which is the root cause of GIC, 
counting sunspots is a very practical measure of Sun activity. 
 
                                                                
4
 The discovery of the Zeeman effect made remote measurements of magnetic field-strengths possible through 
analyzing the properties of spectral lines in the sunlight. 
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Figure 7: 262 years of sunspot data (data courtesy SIDC-team). 
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Figure 8: Cycle 24 prediction of January 2012. The 50% line indicates the predicted smoothed (over a year) sunspot number and the 5% 
and 95% curve indicates the expected upper and lower limit of the monthly smoothed sunspot number (prediction data courtesy of 
David H. Hathaway, MSFC, monthly sunspot number data courtesy SIDC-team). 
4.1.3 SOLAR FLARES, CORONAL MASS EJECTIONS AND SOLAR PROTON EVENTS 
Solar flares and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) often occur in close temporal proximity and have earlier been 
considered as being parts of the same phenomenon, but are today considered as being separate phenomena.  
Solar flares are bursts of high energy electromagnetic radiation, ranging from gamma rays to extreme 
ultraviolet, and are seldom visible to the naked eye. 
A coronal mass ejection is essentially a magnetic explosion inside the Sun that propels a massive cloud of 
charged particles out into interplanetary space. These plasma clouds can contain in the order of billions of tons 
of matter and can be accelerated to several millions of meter per second, and will typically reach Earth in the 
order of 20 hours to several days. During solar maxima the Sun produces 3 CMEs per day on average while only 
producing 1 every 5 days during a minimum (Fox, n.d.). CME are the main source of geomagnetic storms and 
GIC. 
Larger CMEs often also produce a solar proton event (SPE) which consists of bursts of high energy protons with 
kinetic energy in the range of 10 MeV to 100 MeV. They can reach Earth in less than an hour. Table 1 (on page 
24) lists several effects these phenomena can have on Earth and Earth’s technological systems. These effects 
will be described in more detail in the following chapter. 
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4.2 EARTH AND THE MAGNETOSPHERE 
When the solar wind comes into contact with Earth and the magnetosphere, the solar wind will transfer some 
of its energy to Earth, and this energy can affect Earth’s systems in a variety of ways (see Table 1 on page 24). 
In the following chapter these effects and their underlying mechanisms will be discussed, with a special focus 
on GIC. 
4.2.1 THE MAGNETOSPHERE 
 
 
Figure 9: The Earth's magnetosphere (courtesy of NASA). 
The physics behind the solar wind-magnetosphere-ionosphere coupling chain is quite complex and a detailed 
description is out of scope for this report. Very simplified one can say that the charged particles of the solar 
wind are provided with a way to enter into near Earth regions through the cusps of Earth’s magnetic field. This 
explains why high latitude areas are generally more susceptible to GIC, auroras and other space weather 
phenomena. Figure 9 also gives us a hint of why the Earth’s axial tilt and the season of the year will have an 
impact on the severity of GIC events. As the solar wind interacts with the magnetosphere it causes a current to 
flow in the ionosphere. This current can reach several millions of Amperes and is known as an electrojet. 
4.2.2 GEOMAGNETIC LATITUDE 
The effects of geomagnetic storms are highly dependent on geomagnetic latitude
5
, and the effects in the 
auroral regions are orders higher than at lower latitudes. In fact auroras are another and less adverse effect of 
                                                                
5
 Analogous to geographic latitude but relating to the magnetic poles instead of the geographic poles. 
 
Solar 
wind 
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the electrojets. Data suggests that there is a threshold around 50-55 degrees of geomagnetic latitude that 
holds for most extreme geomagnetic storms. Geoelectric field amplitudes experience a drop of around a factor 
of 10 from 60 to 40 degrees geomagnetic latitude. It should be pointed out that there are still limited amount 
of data from extreme geomagnetic storms and it is hard to predict how far towards the equator a 100-year 
storm would reach (Pulkkinen et al., 2012). 
It should also be pointed out that South Africa (around 40 degrees of geomagnetic latitude) was affected by the 
“Halloween storm” in spite of its sub 50 latitudes. Unfortunately the investigation of GIC in Africa is hampered 
by the scarcity of magnetometers on the continent (Gaunt & Coetzee, 2007). 
4.2.3 GEOMAGNETIC STORMS 
If the cloud from a coronal mass ejection intersects Earth, the plasma cloud and the Earth’s magnetic field start 
to interact, causing a geomagnetic storm. Some of the energy of the CME will be transferred to the 
magnetosphere which in its turn may transfer the energy to the electrojets. Changes in the current of the 
electrojet causes fluctuations in the geomagnetic field which, in accordance with Faraday’s Law of induction 
(see Equation 3), induces an electric field in the ground (see Equation 1) (Wik, 2008). 
4.2.4 GEOMAGNETICALLY INDUCED CURRENTS 
The characteristics of the geoelectric field are dependent on the fluctuations of the electrojets and the ground 
conductivity of the earth. Simplified one could say that the magnitude of the geoelectric field increases with 
increasing time derivative of the electrojets current and with decreasing ground conductivity. 
The geoelectric field in its turn will drive currents within conducting structures, such as pipelines, power lines 
and signaling cables, at and below the surface of the earth, see Figure 2 and Figure 10 (Pulkkinen, 2003; 
Lindahl, 2003). 
There are several variables that influence the strength of the geoelectric field during disturbed space weather 
and this contributes both to difficulties in accurately prognosticating the severity of a coming solar storm as 
well as in extreme event analysis. Some of these factors are: (a) solar activity which influences both the 
probability and strength of a solar storm, (b) the path, size, magnetic field-strength and -orientation of a CME 
cloud all have a big impact on how much energy can be transferred to the magnetosphere, and (c) the time of 
year and time of day when a CME hits affect which regions will be affected and how the magnetosphere is 
oriented with respect to the Sun. Other time varying factors that that can impact the consequences of a solar 
storm are (d) the load of the power system and thus how sensitive the system is to GIC at that time (see 
Chapter 6.3) and (e) several CMEs can also hit Earth in close temporal proximity and superimpose the effects of 
one storm upon another. It is hard to predict how all these factors will interact and if they will increase or 
decrease the consequences for the power system. 
But there are other factors that are not time variant that can be taken into account when assessing a systems 
susceptibility to solar storms such as: (f) geomagnetic latitude, (g) ground conductivity, (h) layout and electrical 
properties of the power system, and (i) geographical features. These can all be taken into account and used in 
simulations to identify highly vulnerable areas of the power system. 
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Figure 10: Illustration of GIC in power grid, fluctuations in the electrojet induces a geoelectric field on the ground, the electric field then 
induces a current (GIC) to enter through grounded transformers and starts to flow in the power system (Lindahl, 2003). 
When simulating GIC in power systems one needs to approximate field strength of the geoelectric field at 
injection points, such as grounded transformers. It has been shown (Viljanen et al., 2004) that one can 
accurately estimate the geoelectric field components
6
 (     ) from the strength of the geomagnetic field 
(     ) and knowledge of the local ground conductivity. This is of practical interest since the magnetic field 
fluctuations are easier to measure than the actual geoelectric field strength. Here x and y is in the horizontal 
plane of the ground and the x-axis is northward pointing and the y-axis is eastward pointing.  
  ( )  
 ( )  ( )
  
    ( )  
 ( )  ( )
  
  
Equation 1: Geoelectric field calculated from geomagnetic field. 
Here  ( )is the surface impedance, which depends on the ground conductivity,  is the angular frequency of 
the fluctuating field and    is the permeability in vacuum (Viljanen et al., 2004). 
A sometimes practical, but not straightforward, way of measuring the geoelectric field is by measuring earth to 
pipe potential in long straight sections of pipelines. 
When simulations on system level GIC is impractical one can use the following linear relation (Equation 2) to 
calculate GIC at a single point. Several studies have shown Eq.2 to be a good approximation (Pulkkinen et al., 
2012). 
                                                                
6
 This is derived from the plane wave relation between the electric- and magnetic-field,  
 
 
 ̂    where  ̂ is 
the unit vector pointing in the direction of the wave vector  . 
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Equation 2: Simplified GIC calculations 
Here (   ) are system specific parameters typically in the range of 0-200 
     
 
. If no transformer data is known 
then       
     
 
 can give a good approximation of the sum of GIC flowing over all three phases 
(Pulkkinen et al., 2012). 
Although the GIC is fluctuating in nature (about 0.001-0.1Hz), the frequency of the fluctuation is very low in 
comparison to that of the AC grid (50 or 60Hz) and thus it is often practical to think of it as a direct current or 
quasi direct current when looking at its effects on power applications. See Figure 11 for example of geoelectric 
field fluctuation and in extension GIC fluctuation (see Equation 2). 
The following reading is recommended for a reader interested in performing simulations or interested in a 
more rigorous mathematical model of GIC ; chapter 2 of “Geomagnetic induction during highly disturbed space 
weather conditions: studies of ground effects” (Pulkkinen, 2003) and “Paper A” of “The Sun, Space Weather 
and Effects” (Wik, 2008) (which also includes examples of the (   ) parameters for transformers in the 
southern part of Sweden). 
 
Figure 11: Example of an extreme GIC event. The data is based on the “Halloween storm” but amplitudes have been scaled to simulate a 
100-year storm (see Chapter 8.1 100-year extreme GIC event ). One interesting aspect to note in this diagram is the temporal properties 
of the event. Geoelectric field data like this can be used to evaluate a systems susceptibility to GIC (data courtesy of Antti Pulkkinen). 
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4.2.5 OTHER EFFECTS OF SOLAR STORMS 
This section is included to give a more complete picture of how different forms of solar storms affect Earth and 
its systems. See also Table 1. 
SOLAR FLARES 
The effects of solar flares will reach Earth at the speed of light (approximately 8 minutes) and its effects will 
usually last for 1 to 2 hours. Due to ionospheric radio interference (see Table 1) solar flares can disrupt satellite 
communications, radar and produce shortwave radio fades and blackouts but they seldom have much effect on 
ground level systems (Marusek, 2007). 
SOLAR PROTON EVENTS 
A solar proton event (SPE) can reach Earth in between 15 minutes and up to a few hours, and its effects can last 
for days. 
SPE causes a significant radiation hazard for astronauts and spacecrafts but there is no evidence suggesting 
that SPE is harmful to humans at ground level, as Earth’s magnetic field will prevent the protons from reaching 
down to ground level. However high altitude flights, especially in the polar regions, can be affected by 
increased radiation during these events.  
Satellites and other spacecrafts can suffer temporary or permanent damage to electrical equipment. 
SPEs can also significantly contribute to depletion of the outer regions of the ozone layer (Marusek, 2007). 
CORONAL MASS EJECTION 
These clouds of magnetized plasma can reach Earth within 17 hours but a more typical travel time is 2 to 4 
days. They can cause all of the symptoms listed below and in Table 1, with the exception of ozone layer 
depletion and its effects on the magnetic field can last for days (Marusek, 2007). 
Table 1: Solar storm effects (Marusek, 2007). 
   
Effect Coronal Mass Ejection Solar Flare Solar Proton Event 
Geomagnetically Induced Current  X   
Geomagnetic field distortions X  X 
Ionospheric radio interference X X X 
Nuclear radiation X  X 
Ozone layer depletion   X 
Aurora borealis X   
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5 COMPONENT LEVEL CONSEQUENCES 
Any grounded component of the power grid can be an injection point of GIC into the system but it is mainly 
iron core components that are adversely affected by DC flow. Almost all effects of GIC in the power system can 
be traced back to the saturation of power transformers (Lindahl, 2003), thus transformers are a good starting 
point for an investigation of risk for the power system.  
Some readers might prefer to read Chapter 8 “The likelihood of solar storms” before reading this chapter. 
5.1 POWER TRANSFORMERS 
The basic principle behind all power transformers is to transfer electric energy from one AC voltage system to 
another via magnetic energy. This is done by taking advantage of the principles behind Faraday’s law, which 
states that a time varying magnetic field will induce an electromotive force, much like a voltage. 
In its simplest form a transformer consists of two electrical conductors wound around a core of ferromagnetic 
material such as iron or steel. These two windings, called primary and secondary winding, are electrically 
insulated from each other and are only connected by the magnetic field in the core material. 
 
Figure 12: Idealized 1-phase transformer (BillC@Wikipedia, 2007). 
Faraday's law of induction states that the electromotive force (emf) is proportional to the rate of change of the 
magnetic flux. This implies that when a current starts to flow through the primary winding it will induce a 
change in the magnetic flux in the transformer core which30 
 in its turn will induce an emf in the secondary winding. 
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If we take the ideal transformer in Figure 12 as an example, Faraday's law of induction states that 
                        
  
  
 
⇔    
 
  
∫     
                          
  
  
 
Equation 3: Faraday’s law as applied to a transformer. 
where V is the electromotive force, N is the number of windings and 
  
  
 is the change in magnetic flux( ). The 
magnetic flux is the sum of the magnetic B-field flowing through a cross section of the core. For an ideal 
transformer 
  
  
 will be the same at both primary and secondary side (no energy loses) which gives us the simple 
relation: 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
⇔     
  
  
 
Equation 4: Transformer equation. 
This means that the ratio of windings 
  
  
, called turns ratio, will determine the emf ratio between primary and 
secondary side. 
Simply put this means that an AC on the primary side, with emf   , will induce an alternating magnetic flux ( ) 
in the core material. This flux will flow through the core and through the windings on the secondary side where 
it will induce the emf   . It is the magnetic flux in the core that may be affected by GIC. To understand this we 
have to know a little bit more about what happens in the core. 
The core material of the transformer is chosen for its high permeability, i.e. its low resistance to magnetic flux. 
To better understand the concept of permeability ( ) one could make an analogy to conductivity ( ) in 
electrical conductors, high conductivity means it is easy for the electrical current to flow through the conductor 
and it is inversely proportional to resistance ( ) (    ⁄ ). In the same way one could say that the more 
conductive a material is to magnetic flux, the higher its permeability. And like conductivity is the inverse of 
resistance, permeability is inversely proportional to magnetic reluctance ( ) (    ⁄ ). The transformer core 
is in other word designed to provide a path of low magnetic reluctance for the magnetic field much in the same 
way as an electric conductor is meant to form a low resistive path for an electric current. This analogy can be 
helpful for the understanding of how a transformer works even though there are important differences 
between the permeability and conductivity. One very important difference is that the core can become 
saturated with magnetic flux in a way we do not see in electric conductors (see Figure 13). Once the core has 
become saturated it cannot hold any higher magnetic field and additional magnetic flux will have to find other 
paths (e.g. through the air and transformer casing surrounding the transformer). Another important difference 
is a difference of scale, while the permeability of the core material is in the order of         times greater 
than that of air the difference in conductivity between a conductor and air is in the order of     , i.e. air acts as 
a very effective electric isolator while it does not form an effective barrier for magnetic flux. Leakage flux is 
quite common in transformers even under normal operation and affects voltage regulation and power losses. 
GIC risks relating to leakage flux will be discussed in more details further on in this report (see page 32) 
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Figure 13: Saturation curve for a transformer core,    . Here the B- axis can be interpreted as the internal magnetic field (the 
magnetic flux) in the core and the H-axis can be interpreted as the amount of magnetizing current that will flow through the primary 
winding needed for the induction of the B-field in the core. In the linear region the permeability (µ) can be considered constant. 
Under normal operation a transformer will operate within the linear region below the core material saturation 
limit (see Figure 13). For reasons of economic efficiency the amount of core material in power transformers is 
chosen close to the specified operating limit and even under normal conditions the transformer will use the 
entire linear region up to the saturation threshold. As power transformers are built to operate with alternating 
current (AC), a direct current (DC) superimposed on the AC, which offsets the BH-curve vertically, will quickly 
cause the transformer core to saturate. This is in fact exactly what happens when GIC enters into the 
transformer through the neutral point. The consequences of this will soon be described in more detail, but first 
a short discussion about saturation of different cores and types of power transformers. 
One of the most important findings made since the Hydro-Québec event is that different types of power 
transformers are affected to different extent. The sensitivity to GIC is very dependent on how the core is 
designed; it is a question of return paths for the DC induced magnetic flux (see Figure 14). Single phase 
transformers are more sensitive than three phase transformers. Both single phase transformers and three 
phase transformers come in many different core designs and they have differences in GIC susceptibility. The 
two most important types of three phase transformers are three legged and five legged and thus we will limit 
further discussions to those two. 
In Figure 14, the yellow arrows symbolize the induction of magnetic flux from the windings and the smaller 
white arrows symbolize the possible return paths for GIC induced flux. As can be seen both the single phase 
transformer and the five legged tree phase transformer have two of the smaller white arrows each, giving an 
indication that they are more likely to saturate from a DC bias. This is in fact also the case. There will still flow 
the same amount of GIC through a tree legged transformers as through a five legged but the three legged will 
not saturate as easily (Rejminger, 1996; Andréasson, 2006; Lindahl, 2003; Fuchs & Masoum, 2008). 
 
H 
B 
Linear region 
Saturation region 
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Figure 14: Transformer core types. GIC susceptibility varies between different core types. The presence of low reluctance return paths 
(white arrows) increases the cores tendency to saturate during GIC induced DC bias.  
5.1.1 TRANSFORMER CONSEQUENCES 
When GIC starts to flow through a transformer winding it will DC bias the transformer and cause the core to 
start to saturate (see Figure 15). This saturation will cause: (a) production of both even and odd harmonics, (b) 
a substantial increase in reactive power consumption and (c) increased heat production and an increase of 
transformer losses (efficiency declines). The severity of these effects depends on the strength of the 
geomagnetic disturbance. Here follows a more detailed description of each of these effects and their 
consequences. 
One way of describing what happens when the transformer core reaches saturation is that the permeability of 
the core drops drastically, which means that the inductance and thus the impedance of the transformer also 
will drop. As the impedance drops, the magnetization current increases inversely proportional to the drop 
according to Ohm’s law (see Figure 15 and Equation 5). This will lead to a deformation of the AC current sine 
wave (see Figure 16). 
               
 
 ( )
 
Equation 5: Ohm’s law.  
 29  
 
 
Figure 15: GIC in transformer. The green lines illustrate normal operation and red lines illustrate a situation with a DC bias. As DC bias 
increases, forcing the core into half cycle saturation, the magnetization current (H-axis) will increase drastically. 
5.1.2 HARMONICS GENERATION AND REACTIVE POWER CONSUMPTION 
The deformation of the sinusoidal current caused by the increased magnetization current has consequences to 
the power system. Here follows a short discussion about these. 
HARMONICS GENERATION 
As the transformer reaches saturation and the magnetization current increases as described above (see Figure 
15), the sinusoidal current is severly deformed (see the middle graph in Figure 16). AC power systems are 
designed for a pure sine wave form of the current, hence deformation of the curve form will lead to a variety of 
problems. A common way of describing this aspect of power quality is by measuring the harmonic content of 
the current.  
 
H 
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Magnetization current 
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Figure 16: Example of harmonics generation due to GIC (from performed GIC simulation, see Appendix on page 53 for simulation 
model). 
Top: Graph shows current wave form (green) during normal operation. 
Mid: Current wave form (red) when the same transformer, as used in top graph, is subjected to dc-bias. Notice the strong deformation 
due to increased magnetization current. 
Bottom: Spectrum showing harmonics contents in the dc biased current shown in the mid diagram. THD, Total Harmonic Distortion is a 
measurement of the harmonic distortion content. 
When subjected to the DC bias of GIC a transformer becomes a rich source of both even and odd harmonics 
(see the bottom diagram of Figure 16) (Lu et al., 1993; Ma et al., 2010). This has been confirmed by transformer 
simulations in SimPowerSystems, a module in Simulink and Matlab. This simulation model can provide realistic 
quantitative data (see Figure 16 and Figure 17) and the model is presented in Appendix. 
The increased harmonics contents in the current can lead to a number of problems in the power system, 
among them: 
 Mis-operation of protective relays; 
 Overheating of capacitor banks; 
 Overloading of harmonic filters of HVDC; 
 Increased reactive power consumption; 
(Fuchs & Masoum, 2008). 
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Both the mis-operation of protective relays and increased reactive power consumption will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
REACTIVE POWER CONSUMPTION 
Another result of increased magnetisation current is a substantial increase of reactive power consumption (see 
Figure 17). This can lead to instability in the power system and thus risk of voltage colapse. This has also been 
shown through the simulations mentioned above. 
 
Figure 17: Reactive power consumption in simulated transformer (see Appendix on page 53 for simulation model). At time zero a 
constant GIC starts to flow through the transformer and the core starts to saturate. Once the core is satureted (about time 4s) the 
reactive power consumtion remains constant. 
5.1.3 HEATING AND CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF TRANSFORMER 
Heating of the transformer is another risk relating to the presence of GIC in the transformer. There are two 
separate mechanisms that lead to increased heating of a transformer during GIC induced half-wave core 
saturation. The first relates to heating of the windings and the second relates to magnetic flux leakage. 
HEATING OF THE WINDINGS AND FAILURE OF TRANSFORMER 
Heating of windings is arguably the greatest GIC related risk as it can lead to catastrophic failure of the 
transformer. In this event repairs will be difficult, if at all possible, and spare parts or replacement unit can have 
lead-times exceeding 18 months during normal market-conditions (see Supply risk on page 35). 
The current flowing through a transformer winding follows Ohm’s law as described in Equation 5. The 
impedance (Z) of the transformer winding has two components, a resistive and an inductive part where the 
inductive part is dominant. When the core saturates the inductance drops dramatically and thus the current 
increases, as discussed above. The increase in current flowing over the resistive part of Z leads to an increased 
generation of heat in the windings. 
       
   
Equation 6: Heat generation in transformer windings. 
If allowed to continue, the increased heat generation in the windings can lead to permanent damage to the 
windings (see Figure 5) and possibly fire, resulting in a catastrophic failure of the transformer. 
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HEATING DUE TO MAGNETIC FLUX LEAKAGE 
As the transformer core saturates it will no longer provide the induced magnetic flux from the primary winding 
with a path of low magnetic reluctance. The magnetic flux will find new return paths of relatively low 
reluctance, such as structural components of the transformer made of ferromagnetic material. As these parts, 
such as pull rods etc., are not designed to minimize eddy current
7
 induction from the leakage flux they will start 
to heat up. This heating will be localized to high flux regions of the new return paths. This can lead to damage 
of structural parts, general rise in temperature of the transformer and gassing (gas generation) of the tank oil. 
A general temperature increase in the transformer oil will also lessen its ability to dissipate heat from the 
transformer windings making permanent winding damage more likely.  
Permanent transformer damage has been documented both from the 1989 storm at the Salem Nuclear Power 
Plant (see Figure 5 on page 14) in USA and from the “Halloween storm” of 2003 in South Africa. Also during the 
Halloween storm, a transformer at a Swedish nuclear power plant experienced a 13˚C increase in top oil 
temperature in a transformer containing 69 tons of oil before mitigating action were taken to allow the 
transformer to cool down. Gassing in transformer oil and burnt paint on transformers tanks casing are other 
observed GIC- related incidents (Gaunt & Coetzee, 2007; Baker et al., 2008; Marusek, 2007; H. Swahn, personal 
communication, September 15, 2011). 
CUMULATIVE DAMAGE TO TRANSFORMERS 
It is reasonable to assume that there are transformers in operation that have up until now undiscovered GIC 
related damages that might be more susceptible to further GIC damage. This could hypothetically be due to 
increased resistance at the site of damage and thus it would be prone to additional heat generation at that site. 
There are indications that this kind of cumulative effect exists but there is yet not enough data to support this 
hypothesis. 
5.1.4 INCREASE OF TRANSFORMER LOSSES 
An overall loss of transformer efficiency has been observed during experiments. The losses seem to depend 
linearly on GIC, thus in extension on the geomagnetically induced electric- and magnetic-field (Lahtinen & 
Elovaara, 2002). 
5.2 MIS-OPERATION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYS 
Mis-operation of protective relays is a common failure mode during geomagnetic storms.  
A protective relay is a device meant to disconnect any element of a power system that experiences a fault or 
operates in an abnormal manner. There are two principal ways a protective relay can be unreliable, they can 
fail to operate when expected to or they can operate when not expected to. Thus when setting these relays 
there are two reliability factors to take into consideration, namely dependability and security. Dependability is 
a measure of the likelihood that the protective relay will operate correctly for all faults that they are expected 
to operate for. Security is a measure of likelihood that the protective relay will not operate incorrectly for any 
                                                                
7
 Eddy current is circular currents induced in conductors when they are exposed to a changing magnetic field 
(magnetic flux). In accordance with Ohm’s law this causes heat generation and transformer losses. 
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fault. These two factors are opposed and finding the right balance between the two can sometimes be hard 
(Horowitz, 2003). 
In this GIC related context it is the security of protective relays that is of most interest, i.e. during geomagnetic 
storms there is a likelihood of protective relays misinterpreting the harmonics content in the AC and sense false 
fault conditions. Without going into details about the inner workings of protective relays, one can summarize 
that protective relays are sensitive to the harmonic content in the current and particularly to the third 
harmonics of the fundamental frequency. During geomagnetic storms transformers can produce large amounts 
of harmonics as described above; if this harmonic content is high enough it can cause the protective relay to 
erroneously sense a fault and trip (T. Johannesson, personal communication, November 22, 2011). 
The consequences at system level of incorrect tripping of lines and equipment will be discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter. When analyzing the consequences at system level due to the mis-operation of 
protective relays, one should take the possibility of several simultaneous trips into consideration since they are 
usually set to trip under similar circumstances and a very severe storm can reasonably be expected to cause 
these circumstances over a large area simultaneously. 
Erroneous protective relay tripping is what lead to the power outage in Malmö 2003 and also played a key role 
in the events that led to the province wide power outage in Québec 1989 (Malmgren, 2003; Hydro-Québec, 
n.d.). 
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6 CONSEQUENCES AT SYSTEM LEVEL 
Depending on the severity of a geomagnetic disturbance, the consequences at power systems component 
level, detailed in the previous chapter, can have a series of consequences at the system level, ranging from no 
system impact at all to widespread voltage collapse significantly disrupting critical infrastructure. 
6.1 LOCAL POWER OUTAGE  
The power system has several different voltage levels where the highest voltage systems are used for long 
distance transmission of electricity. The lower voltage levels are used for distribution to consumers. The 
highest voltage levels, in Sweden 400kV and 130kV, are set up in a mesh configuration while the lower voltage 
levels, 50kV and lower in the Swedish power system, are set up in a radial configuration, much like a tree with 
stem and branches. The mesh configuration provides redundancy, and if a protective relay trips a single line in 
the transmission system this would normally not cause a power outage, but it would increase the strain on the 
remainder of the system. If the protective relay on the other hand disconnects a part of a radial distribution 
system, then any point downstream from the tripped relay would be temporarily out of power until that relay 
has been reset. This is exactly what happened in Malmö on October 30
th
 2003 when 50 000 customers where 
disconnected (Malmgren, 2003, T. Johannesson, personal communication, November 22, 2011). 
This loss of power consumption could be expected to have a strengthening effect on the rest of the system, 
since a severe geomagnetic storm will strain the power system due to increased transformer losses, increased 
reactive power demand and the possible loss of production or import, etc.  
Local power outage could also have damaged transformers as root cause and in that case it could take a 
substantial time to return the system to normal operation downstream of that point. 
6.2 LOSS OF PRODUCTION 
A power production unit or import/export unit is connected to the distribution system at a single point, and if a 
protective relay trips a line or disconnects a transformer at that point then all of that production is temporarily 
lost. Short term this increases the strain on the power system and can be part of a chain of events that leads to 
voltage collapse. This is part of the course of events that led to voltage collapse in Québec 1989. 
If the disconnection is due to damaged equipment this can be a long term issue and substantial values can be 
lost in addition to repair cost.  
Thus it can sometimes be a rational mitigation strategy to temporarily decrease load or disconnect 
transformers, at danger of permanent damage, during GIC events (H. Swahn, personal communication, 
September 15, 2011). 
6.3 VOLTAGE COLLAPSE 
High load in the transmission system can cause a variety of problems, voltage regulation is one among them. 
During geomagnetic storms reactive power consumption in transformers will increase radically leading to an 
increased strain on the power system. This can by itself lead to a voltage collapse especially during periods of 
high consumption and high utilization of transmission capacity such as during cold periods. Unfortunately the 
reactive power consumption covariates with harmonics production, heating of transformers and other GIC 
related risks (see Chapter 5) which can lead to situations where production and transmission capacity are lost 
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which drastically can increase the likelihood of a system wide voltage collapse. This is what happened 1989 
during the Hydro-Québec event (see Chapter 3.2). 
Simulations performed by Svenska Kraftnät in 2003 (Kielén, 2004) concluded that the Swedish transmission 
system, at that time, would normally have the capacity to handle the increased reactive power consumption 
during a geomagnetic storm as long as the system was intact. They also concluded that the following situations 
could lead to an increased risk of voltage collapse: 
 High consumption; 
 High transmission, with one or more generators, transmission lines, transformers or shunt capacitor 
banks out of service; 
 Extreme geoelectric field amplitudes (| |    
 
  
). 
Unfortunately it is likely that the system will not be intact during extreme storms such as a 100-year storm. To 
further investigate the consequences of extreme GIC levels on the power system system-wide simulations 
needs to be performed. These  simulations needs to that take both component and system effects into 
account, in order to simulate the covariance and interdependencies factors of GIC in the power system. 
A selective shutdown of parts of the net is a possible but not very attractive mitigation strategy during severe 
geomagnetic storms. 
6.4 SUPPLY RISK 
Transformers and transformer spare parts can have lead-times in the range of one to two years under normal 
market conditions. It is reasonable to assume that geomagnetic storms strong enough to damage a transformer 
to the extent that it needs repair or replacement could also have damaged other transformers, this increased 
demand for spare parts or replacement units could create a worldwide shortage of transformer production 
capability.   
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7 CONSEQUENCE FOR OTHER TYPES OF SYSTEMS 
Due to increased interconnectedness and interdependencies, the effects of solar storms on other types of 
systems can have direct or indirect consequences for the power supply system. In this chapter the 
consequences for communication and control systems will be discussed followed by a discussion about how 
pipelines are affected.  
7.1 COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Communication systems today are quite complex and their different parts are subject to certain solar storm 
related risks. 
Today much of communication infrastructures for critical infrastructures are based on optical fibers which are 
not directly susceptible to GIC. However, there is still a substantial part of communications routed through 
copper wire and thus susceptible to GIC, which could lead to both temporary disruption of service and 
permanent damage to equipment. Signal repeaters have been known to fail due to GIC, and thus even optical 
fiber systems are not immune (Medford et al., 1989). This is true for telecommunications and other 
communications systems such as those used for monitoring and control of power systems and train signaling 
(see Appendix for a case study of disturbance of train-signaling in southern Sweden). There are many other GIC 
related incidents for communication systems, the trans-Atlantic cable between Newfoundland and Scotland 
February 1958 being the best known (Pulkkinen, 2003). 
Satellites and spacecrafts are especially sensitive to disturbed space weather since they cannot take advantage 
of the protection from Earth’s magnetosphere. There is both a likelihood of equipment damage to the satellites 
and a likelihood of disruption of their communication due to disturbances in the ionosphere. The latter is 
particularly true for communication satellites and GPS signaling (Baker et al., 2008). Furthermore the amount 
of radio interference increases markedly due to the above mentioned ionospheric disturbances. Disruption of 
communication can range from induced noise to complete signal loss. Shortwave radio is especially afflicted by 
these disturbances. 
The communication systems are also dependent on power supply to run and battery backups will start to run 
out after 15 minutes without power in the Swedish 3G system (E. Andersson MSB, personal communication, 
November 16, 2011). 
Today there are many systems relying on GPS navigation and timing signals to sequence and control processes. 
These systems can be directly or indirectly affected. The use of GPS in this context can often be unknown to the 
operator and thus this risk is in danger of not being identified until after an event. 
Short term this can complicate control and repair of power systems as well as any other function relying on 
communication during and after a severe solar storm. Long term it could cause problems for any control 
system without redundancy that relies on a single form of communication, especially if this system relies on a 
single satellite to function. 
7.1.1 AIR TRAFFIC 
Air traffic will likely suffer delays due to rerouting and possibly cancelation of flights, especially intercontinental 
flights routed over the northern polar regions due to increased radiation at high altitudes there, and due to 
communication and navigation interference (see above and Chapter 3.3).  
 37  
 
7.2 CORROSION ON GAS PIPELINES 
As mentioned above GIC flows through all long conducting structures. The cathodic protection of pipelines can 
temporarily be rendered inoperative during disturbed space weather resulting in increased corrosion rate of 
the pipeline.  
To counter the corrosive environment of the earth in which the pipe is buried a combination of insulating 
coating and cathodic protection (CP) are often used. The pipe is made the cathode of an electrochemical cell 
either by attaching a sacrificial cathode (galvanic CP) or by applying a negative pipe-to-earth voltage of about 
1V (impressed current CP/ active CP). Due to the size of pipeline structures active cathodic protection is 
routinely used in combination with coating of mechanically protective polyethylene insulation (Edwall & 
Boteler, 2001). 
When a geoelectric field acts on a pipeline, GIC starts flowing in the pipeline. This would not be a problem if the 
GIC only flowed in the pipe, but due to inhomogeneities of the pipeline and surrounding earth GIC can flow 
from the pipe to the surrounding earth, especially near ends or bends of the pipeline. This can easily result in 
pipe-to-soil voltages of a few volts which is several times greater than that of the active cathodic protection (-
1.0 V) and thus GIC can temporarily make the active CP inoperative and possibly also contribute to corrosion of 
the pipeline (Pirjola, 1999; Gummow et al., 2002). The increase in corrosion rate has proven to be hard to 
quantify. 
During geomagnetic storms there is a high probability of increase in the corrosion rate of pipelines. It has been 
estimated that the active cathodic protection could be inoperative in the order of two weeks on a yearly basis 
during periods of high solar activity (H-E Edwall, personal communication, June  22, 2011). 
The conductivity through the insulating coating of the pipe varies linearly with the length of the pipe. Also the 
voltage difference for the endpoints of the pipe is linearly length dependent. According to Ohm’s law a 50% 
reduction of the length of conducting pipe will thus lead to 75% reduction of GIC (see Equation 7). This is of 
course quite simplistic but helps to understand the mechanism. 
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Equation 7: GIC in pipelines as a function of length. 
Thus an electric sectioning of the pipe with the use of insulating joints can drastically decrease the influence of 
GIC on pipelines. 
The Swedish gas-pipelines, including E.ON owned parts, are already today sectioned off with insulating joints 
and the longest section is less than 50km (H-E Edwall, personal communication, June  22, 2011). 
  
 38  
 
8 THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOLAR STORMS 
Geomagnetic storms are fairly uncommon phenomena, and when they occur it is only some of the strongest 
that have any consequence for power systems. Most geomagnetic storms will go unnoticed since they do not 
have any observable properties except for auroras and some increase in radio noise. Thus the majority of 
people will not have any intuitions about the frequency of solar storms of different strengths. Only the 
strongest geomagnetic storms pose a threat to power systems, but once part of a system is affected by a solar 
storm the effects can quickly cascade through the power system and give rise to large scale consequences. 
The likelihood of solar storms does not follow a uniform probability distribution curve but rater it varies with 
the solar cycle. This is especially true for coronal mass ejections, which are the main source of risk for power 
systems. As mentioned previously the likelihood of a CME is roughly 15 times greater during solar maxima 
compared to solar minima (page 19). 1 to 15 is also roughly the difference in sunspot activity between solar 
minimum and maximum (see Figure 18). It is not an unreasonable approximation that the likelihood of a CME 
has a roughly linear relation with the number of sunspots. 
In Figure 18, GIC related incidents in Swedish technological systems are plotted over a sunspot activity graph, 
giving a picture of the frequency of storms strong enough to generate disturbances. The plotted events are 
limited to documented events known to the author and it is likely that several relevant events have been left 
out, which could explain the apparent calm during the sixties and seventies. 
 
Figure 18: Documented GIC events (red vertical lines) in Sweden overlaid on a solar activity digram. The Hydro-Québec event (wich also 
had effect in Sweden) and the Halloween storm are marked with thick lines. A short case study of the events of July 13-14 1982 is 
available in the Appendix. A list of the all the marked events is also availible in the Appendix (solar activity data courtesy of SIDC (SIDC-
team, 2012)). 
8.1 100-YEAR EXTREME GIC EVENT 
There are several difficulties in estimating reasonable values for 100-year extreme GIC events. There are many 
variables that influences the likelihood of high values of the geoelectric field (see Geomagnetically induced 
currents on page 21). To come up with a useful 100-year GIC event scenario one will have to make 
generalizations and make allowances for variation in the geographic location, i.e. take geomagnetic latitude 
and ground conductivity into account. It is practical to build such a scenario around geoelectric field strength 
since it has a linear relationship with GIC (see Equation 2). 
Recent statistical analysis of geomagnetic data shows that a 100-year storm would have 10 s geoelectrical field 
peak values around 20 V/km in an area with low ground conductivity and high geomagnetic latitude, such as 
 39  
 
the Québec area in Canada (Pulkkinen et al., 2012). Very simplified one could set up the following relationship 
between the geoelectrical field strength, ground conductivity and geomagnetic latitude.  
   ( )   ( )        
Equation 8: This equation shows the relation between geographical factors and the geoelectric field. 
Here  ( ) is a ground conductivity factor typically in the range of 1-4, 1 for high conductivity and 4 for low 
conductivity,  ( )is a geomagnetic latitude factor typically in the range of 1-10, 1 for sub 40° geomagnetic 
latitude and 10 for super 60° geomagnetic latitude (Pulkkinen et al., 2012). For the 100-year storm scenario 
      would have a 10 s peak value of 0.5 V/km and represent the geoelectric field at a sub 40° geomagnetic 
latitude area with high ground conductivity. 
8.2 LIKELIHOOD OF EXTREME EVENTS 
The concept of a 100-year storm normally implies a uniform probability distribution, i.e. the probability of 
occurrence is the same from one year to another. Assuming this we get the following expression for the 
probability of at least one 100-year storm: 
    (  
 
 
)
 
 
⇔    ∏(  
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Equation 9: The exceedance probability of T-year extreme event. 
where T is the storm threshold (100 year in our case) and n is the number of years we are interested in. One 
can calculate that the probability of at least one 100-year extreme event occurring during any one given year 
(T=100, n=1) would be 1%, and the probability of at least one 100-year event over a period of 11 year (T=100, 
n=11) is 10.5%. Since the probability of solar storms occurrence are not a uniform probability distribution 
Equation 9 only holds true when n is a full multiple of a 11-year cycle (          ). 
Thus one needs to take solar activity into account if one is interested in the exceedance probability for a period 
shorter than one solar cycle. As stated above one can approximate a linear relationship between the 
probability of a CME and the sunspot index. In the interest of finding a rough method of calculating the 
probability of solar storms one could make the following additional assumptions; (a) that all CME stands an 
equal chance of travelling earthwards, (b) that the CME giving rise to an extreme GIC event can erupt at any 
time during the solar cycle, (c) that the peak value of the geoelectric field will be caused by a single CME. 
Having made these assumptions one could add a solar activity factor 
  
 ̅
 to Equation 9 and get the following 
expression for exceedance probability: 
    ∏(  
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Equation 10: Solar activity corrected exceedance probability of T-year extrem solar storm. 
where    is the sunspot numbers of year   and  ̅ is the mean sunspot number. Even if the assumptions above is 
a simplification and not entirely true Equation 10 gives us a better tool to estimate probability than the uniform 
distribution assumption of Equation 9. The value of  ̅ will have a significant impact on the calculated 
probability and thus it is important to carefully consider the data set that is used. 
To calculate  ̅ (over full cycles, i.e. between two minimum) one could for example, either choose (a) the period 
for the data that the calculation of the 100-year peak value is based on, see above (1993-2006), (b) a period 
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dating back to the Carrington event 1859 or (c) a period dating back to the start of reliable sunspot data 
records (i.e. back to the oldest minimum April 1754), see Figure 7. 
Table 2: Sunspot mean values. Data used is monthly smoothed sunspot numbers (SIDC-team, 2012). 
Alternative (a) only includes one solar cycle and even though the 100-year extreme value data is gathered 
during this period, earlier data have been taken into account in its validation. Alternative (b) stretches over 15 
cycles and covers almost all available GIC data and should give a better estimate of sunspot mean value, than 
alternative (a). Alternative (c) covers 23 cycles and should provide an even better estimate of mean value but 
since we do not have any reliable solar storm data prior to the period around the Carrington event this mean 
value does not have as good correlation to the data set used for estimating the 100-year extreme events as (a) 
and (b). Thus alternative (b)  ̅     seems to be the most reasonable value to use. 
Since good prediction of sunspot numbers is only available a couple of years ahead and since Equation 10 is a 
rough estimate any probability estimate for longer periods is probably best done in terms of full cycles. 
If one is interested in estimating the exceedance probability of other field strengths than the 100-year extreme 
one can use Equation 10 and insert values from Table 3 or by getting data from Figure 2 in “Statistics of 
extreme geomagnetically induced current events” paper (Pulkkinen et al., 2008). 
T (T-year extreme event) 10 s peak value |     | (see Equation 10) 10 s peak value |               | 
100 0.50 V/km 20 V/km 
11 (one cycle) 0.32 V/km 13 V/km 
Table 3: Table of geoelectric field values for statistical extreme events (Pulkkinen et al., 2008). 
Now using this data and the estimation of cycle 24 (see Figure 8) one can now estimate the probability of a 
100-year storm during 2013 to 1.7% and for the period 2012-2014 the corresponding probability is 4.7%. The 
probability of a 11-year extreme event during the period 2012-2014 is 41%. 
  
Alternative Period Mean value  ̅ 
a March 1996 to November 2008 64 
b December 1855 to November 2008 56 
c April 1754 to November 2008 52 
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9 RISK TREATMENT 
The main focus of this report is risk analysis and not risk treatment. Thus it will not discuss risk treatment 
methodology and only briefly touch upon different possible risk treatment alternatives. 
9.1 SPACE WEATHER FORECASTING 
It is important to accurately predict solar storms in order to be prepared to implement mitigating actions in a 
timely manner and minimize the economic impact for both the society and the owners of affected 
infrastructure. There are a lot of very interesting ongoing research in this area and the prognostication 
capabilities are likely to increase in the future.  
Today there is a worldwide network of 13 regional warning centers
8
 (RWC) dedicated to provide forecasts and 
warnings of disturbances to the solar terrestrial environment which is organized by the International Space 
Environmental Service (ISES). The current forecasting capabilities allows for predictions of solar activity up to a 
month in advance, but it does not provide information about the exact time of the expected disturbance or if a 
CME will travel earthwards. A CME will be detected at the moment of eruption, but it will take longer before its 
travel path and other attributes can be determined and one can predict if it will affect Earth and its severity. 
With the aid of the ACE and SOHO spacecraft among others, located at the L1
9
 point between the Earth and the 
sun, it is possible to receive up to half an hour of advance warning before a CME hits Earth. 
Solar shield is a collaborative project between NASA, Catholic University of America (CUA) and the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) aimed at forecasting space weather effects on power transmission systems. 
The project shows great potential for forecasting GIC in power systems (Pulkkinen et al., 2010). 
9.2 POSSIBLE RISK TREATMENT STRATEGIES 
There are many viable risk treatment alternatives for GIC related risk. 
TRANSFORMER RISK TREATMENT 
There are several technical solutions for stopping GIC from flowing through transformers and thus drastically 
decreasing the risk for a single or a group of transformers and in extension also lessening the system related 
risks (Metatech, 2010; Andréasson, 2006; H. Swahn, personal communication, June 20, 2011). 
 GIC blocking devices: 
o Neutral blocking device (insulation strength of winding neutral); 
o Series capacitors compensation of transmission lines; 
o Neutral capacitor blocking device; 
o Impedance grounding through resistor or reactor; 
o Polarization cells with electrolyte or solid state; 
o Active cancelation through auxiliary winding. 
 Real-time measuring and alerts of GIC through transformer neutral and transformer temperatures.  
 Active cooling of transformers to increase thermal convection. 
 Temporary disconnection of transformers operating close to sustaining permanent damage. 
                                                                
8
 One of these regional warning centers is located in Lund, Sweden. 
9
 The L1 libration point which is a point of Earth-Sun gravitational equilibrium, about 1.5 million km from Earth 
and 148.5 million km from the Sun. 
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PROTECTIVE RELAY RISK TREATMENT 
One of the most important lessons learned from both the Hydro-Québec event in 1989 and the blackout in 
Malmö during the Halloween storm in 2003 was the importance of the setting of correct trip levels to avoid 
unwarranted trips due to GIC generated harmonics. A review of existing relay settings and revision of 
guidelines relating to protective relays with GIC in mind have proven to be one of the most cost effective ways 
to lessen system wide GIC related risk (Malmgren, 2003; Hydro-Québec, n.d.). 
SYSTEM LEVEL RISK TREATMENT 
 Perform simulation of power system to: (a) find high risk transformers, (b) identify acceptable 
threshold levels for -field, -field and GIC, and (c) to calculate system wide reactive power 
consumption. 
 Take GIC into account when defining new transformer specifications. 
 Implementation of voltage collapse avoidance and mitigation strategies such as selective shutdown of 
parts of the net to lower the consumption and increase stability in the system. 
 GIC related education of relevant operations personal.  
 Continuity planning for GIC related risks. 
COMMUNICATION RISK TREATMENT 
 Beforehand analyze communication needs during and after storm to gain a better understanding of 
risk exposure. 
 Implement communication and control backup systems where needed. 
 Investigate control systems´ GPS (navigation and timing) dependency to identify potential risks. 
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10 SUMMARY 
Solar storms have many things in common with other kinds of natural phenomena such as storms, earthquakes 
and tsunamis. They are all risks that have the potential for disaster if not properly managed. But while man has 
had thousands of years of experience of the very tangible effects of the latter three examples and time to 
develop risk treatment strategies, solar storms are abstract and its effects are next to invisible unless you know 
what to look for. We cannot trust our intuition to guide us when assessing solar storm risk and the need for a 
structured risk management process is important for a rational response. The benefits of a structured risk 
management method is substantial for all low frequency /high impact risks, but for solar storms it is 
indispensible since there is no other mechanism in an organization or in society at large that will prompt 
mitigating actions. 
GIC and geomagnetic storms is the result of a very complex chain of events, originating from magnetic energy 
buildup in the interior of the sun. This energy is transferred through interplanetary space, the magnetosphere, 
the ionosphere, the ground to finally end up as a quasi-DC current flowing through transformers in the power 
system. Since transformers are not normally designed to handle DC current flowing through the neutral point 
this causes problems. It causes the transformer core to saturate which in its turn causes several additional 
undesirable phenomena. It is this saturation of the transformer core that is the source of all primary risks to the 
power system. 
Disturbance in the space weather is a fairly uncommon phenomenon and furthermore the Swedish power 
system is thought to be robust enough to handle even quite severe space weather without catastrophic 
failures. Even so solar storms are a very real and physical threat that have the potential to cause substantial 
damage both to the power system and to other critical infrastructures. If not properly handled the 
socioeconomic consequences can be severe. The major consequences to the power system are local or 
nationwide power outages, catastrophic failure of transformers and long term loss of production. 
Even though prognostication of space weather is possible today, the high complexity of these phenomena will 
limit the amount of information that will be available ahead of time. 
SUMMARY OF RISK FACTORS FOR TRANSFORMERS 
Geographical factors 
 High latitudes; 
 High ground resistivity. 
Geometric factors 
 Long transmission lines; 
 Corners in power systems. 
Equipment factors 
 1-phase transformers are more sensitive than 3-phase; 
 For 3-phase transformers, 5 legged are more sensitive than 3 legged. 
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SUMMARY OF RISK FACTORS FOR THE POWER SYSTEM 
 High consumption; 
 High transmission, with one or more generators, transmission lines, transformers or shunt capacitor 
banks out of service; 
 Extreme geoelectric field amplitudes (| |    
 
  
). 
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11 CONCLUSIONS 
This report has given an overview of, the source, likelihood, and possible consequences of solar storm events 
that are strong enough to results in extreme GIC levels in the power systems, in short the necessary parts of a 
risk analysis. This is the first time this has been done in a structured way with risk management methodology, 
to the knowledge of the author, and as such it should add value and facilitate GIC related risk management for 
power systems. 
11.1 A GUIDE TO RISK EVALUATION OF SOLAR STORMS 
A risk value is often defined as the product of consequence and probability of occurrence. The goal of this 
report is in part to enable the reader to calculate a quantitative risk value for GIC risk scenarios, by aiding in 
consequence assessments, and to enable a reasonable estimation of probability of occurrence. 
If one for example is planning the installation of a new transformer, with an expected lifetime of 50 years, the 
probability for a 100-year extreme event to occur during its lifetime is somewhere in the range of 36-42%
10
, 
depending on when, during the solar cycle, it is planned to be installed. It is harder to make general statements 
of quantitative consequence values since it will vary greatly from transformer to transformer, partly due to the 
transformer risk factors (listed on page 43) and partly due to other factors such as where it is installed, the 
value of the equipment, value of lost production, value of lost distribution, availability of replacement units, 
and other risk scenario specific details. 
Due to the comparatively greater complexity of a system compared to its components it will necessarily be a 
more complex task to estimate risk values for the system. On a system level it is important to take the 
interdependencies of the different risks detailed in this report into account. Previous studies of the Swedish 
power systems GIC susceptibility have not taken this into account which to some extent reduces their value for 
risk evaluation at system level. Thus it is recommended that simulations on system level that can take these 
interdependencies into account be performed in order to achieve an accurate risk evaluation. 
Due to the long implementation times for many of the risk treatments mentioned in Chapter 9 it can be 
advisable to take these mitigating actions under consideration well ahead of solar maxima. During times of high 
solar activity and increased likelihood of geomagnetic storms, time restrictions will lessen the freedom of 
actions and in extension opportunity for risk treatment. It is also worth pointing out that severe space weather 
is not limited to solar maxima, disturbances may also occur during solar minima. There are no safe periods, 
only relatively safer ones. 
11.2 INTERDEPENDENCY, COVARIANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Society’s infrastructure is increasingly complex with ever growing levels of dependencies and 
interdependencies. This growing complexity in combination with early adaptation of new technology 
complicates any attempt to understand the full socioeconomic impact of severe space weather. A solar storm 
severe enough to damage the power distribution system will likely have a wide array of consequences also for 
other types of infrastructures, many of which have not been discussed in this report. In other words there will 
likely be a covariance between solar storm related failures both on component and system level, i.e. several 
failures will occur in close temporal proximity. 
                                                                
10
 36% is the exceedance probability for a 100-year extreme storm over 4 cycles (approximately 44 years) and 
42% is the corresponding value for 5 cycles (approximately 55 years), see Chapter 8. 
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The history of solar storms are likely as old as the solar system, but our first experience of the consequences 
they can give rise to is limited to only a century and a half and our accumulated data and knowledge of the Sun 
is far from enough to truly understand all the consequences of the phenomena. 
Both the complexity of society and our lack of knowledge of solar storms contribute to the uncertainty factor 
and thus increase the risk. The suggested further studied as mentioned in below would therefore potentially 
decrease the GIC related risk for both power systems and for society. 
11.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
This research has brought up some issues that need further investigation in order to increase the 
understanding of the risk of geomagnetically induced currents in power systems. These items are not listed in 
any prioritized order. 
Simulation of GIC in the power system. There have been some simulations performed on the Swedish power 
systems (Kielén, 2004; Wik, 2008) but these have been based on a single aspect of geomagnetic storm risk 
(reactive power and GIC, respectively) and they have not taken the full system dynamics and 
interdependencies of harmonics production, reactive power consumption and transformer damage into 
account. The power system has also changed since these simulations were made and new changes are 
planned. These changes have not been taken into consideration in previous simulations. 
Development of better simulation models of different transformer core types for use in above simulations and 
for use in transformer risk evaluation. The currently available simulation models have not been developed with 
GIC generation in mind, thus better transformer models would better approximate differences in GIC response. 
Further statistical analysis of geomagnetic storms with respect to strength, duration and frequency of 
occurrence would lessen the uncertainty factor and increase the accuracy of probability predictions, which 
would lead to more accurate risk evaluation. 
Documentation of new knowledge of transformer design principles to decrease GIC risk during transformer 
planning and production. Development of suitable transformer specification requirements with respect to GIC. 
Further studies into the effect of GIC in HVDC systems.  
11.4 FINAL WORDS 
Going back to the question of how well we are equipped to handle severe space weather, the answer will 
unfortunately not be a straightforward one. The Swedish power system is fairly well equipped to handle storms 
of strengths similar to those that we have come to expect during the last couple of decades. However, the 
same cannot be said for a once in a hundred year storm or stronger without further analysis of the power 
system. Thus it is the consequences of these the very strongest storms that need to be further studied. This 
should not be taken to mean, that storms of lesser strengths does not pose a threat on component level. 
Transformers with high risk values should not be overlooked during risk assessment. 
Due to the low frequency high impact nature of severe solar storm related risk it is of importance to consider 
this risk thoroughly and on a regular basis, failing to do so will not make the risk go away. 
As our knowledge of geomagnetic storm risks increases, so does our opportunities to implement effective risk 
management solutions. 
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL CASE STUDY 
SOUTHERN SWEDEN, JULY 13 AND 14, 1982 
In the night between July 13 and 14, 1982, the traffic lights turned red for a railway section without any 
obvious reason. The railway section was about 45 km in length and situated in the southern part of Sweden. 
After a while the lights turned green and later red again. The reason was that the geoelectric field affected the 
relays. In normal conditions there is a DC voltage of 2.5 to 6 V over the relays, which drives a current pulling the 
relay when the rails are free of trains. When a train comes there will be a short-circuit and the relay switches. 
In the night between July 13 and 14, a negative voltage was induced that was opposite to the abovementioned 
voltage of 2.5-6 V. The relay reacted as if the rails were blocked and caused the traffic lights to turn red. When 
the induced voltage became positive the lights turned green again (Wik, 2008). 
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GIC EVENTS IN SWEDEN 
(Boteler, et.al, 1998; Wik, 2008; Messing, 1986; Messing, 1994; Malmgren, 2003) 
DATE   EFFECTS 
Sept 2, 1859   Problems with the telegraph system in Gothenburg. 
May 13–15, 1921  Fires in telegraph equipment. 
Feb 11, 1958   Fires with severe damage in telegraph equipment. 
Nov 13, 1960   30 line circuit breakers tripped in the high-voltage power network. 
July 13–14, 1982  4 transformers and 15 lines tripped in the high-voltage power system. Railway 
traffic lights turned erroneously to red. Telecommunications were also 
affected. 
Feb 8–9, 1986   5 events in the high-voltage power system, 1-3 lines tripped per event. 
March 13–14, 1989  5, 130 kV, lines tripped, 5-degree temperature increase in a generator. 
March 24, 1991  9, 220 kV, lines and a transformer tripped. 
Nov 9, 1991   1, 220 kV, line tripped. Large pipe-to-soil voltages in a pipeline. 
Feb 21, 94  2, 130 kV, lines tripped. 
1999   Radio communication for protection lost in the power system. 
2000   Voltage drop in the 400 kV system. 
April 6, 2000   Largest ever GIC measured in a transformer (about 300 A). 
Oct 30, 2003   Power blackout in Malmö, excess heating in a transformer. 
Nov 8, 2004   GIC of over 100 A measured in a transformer in southern Sweden. 
A MORE DETAILED LIST OF EVENTS IN SWEDEN DURING THE “HALLOWEEN STORM” OF 2003 
(Kielén, 2004)  
DATE   EFFECTS 
2003-10-29 07:11:42 220 kV line from the power station in Härjedalen tripped, resulting in 140 MW 
of production stopped. 
2003-10-29 07:12:29 130 kV line in Östergötland tripped. The same line trips again at 08:04:10. 
2003-10-29 07:46  400 kV line from SwePol Link at Karlshamn tripped. Import from Poland on 300 
MW disrupted.  
2003-10-30 20:55 400/220 kV transformer in the vicinity of Östersund tripped.  
2003-10-30 21:03:43 400/130 kV transformer in Örebro tripped. Overload in 130 kV net.  
2003-10-30 21:03:44 130/10 kV transformer in the vicinity of Norrköping tripped.  
2003-10-30 21:07:15 130 kV line in Malmö tripped. 50 000 customer without electricity in between 
20 and 50 minutes. 
2003-10-30 21:08:00 130 kV line from Örebro in the southwest direction tripped. 
2003-10-30 21:08:32 130 kV line close to Boden tripped. 
2003-11-20 18:04 400 kV line from SwePol Link at Karlshamn tripped. Import from Poland off 400 
MW disrupted. 
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TRANSFORMER SIMULATION MODEL 
Matlab and Simulink module SimPowerSystems was used to simulate the effects of GIC for this thesis. The 
model in Figure 19 was used for Figure 16 and Figure 17. This model simulates the effects of GIC flowing 
through a transformer. GIC is injected to the system through the controlled voltage sources and exits through 
the neutral points of the transformer. THD is measured in the THD block and reactive power consumption is 
measured through a PQ block. Here the ramp block has been used as a convenient way of providing the 
controlled voltage sources with input. Scopes were used to study various outputs from the model. 
 
Figure 19: SimPowerSystems GIC simulation model.  
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